Experiments on the Core: Some Disconcerting Results for Majority Rule Voting Games by McKelvey, Richard D. & Ordeshook, Peter C.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES ' 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125 
SOME EXPERIMENTAL AMBIGUITIES WITH RESPECT TO 
THE CORE FOR MAJORITY RULE VOTING GAMES* 
Richard D. McKelvey 
California Institute of Technology 
and Carnegie-Mellon University 
and 
Peter C. Ordeshook 
Carnegie-Mellon University 
-.1.S°t\lUTE O'F ''"" ,.,. ' �� �� � � i.c::: ?!: 
� Q 
• I· � /111"'...-'l � 
�&1: �� It SHALL ft\P,.��
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 260 
April 1�7 
SOME EXPERIMENTAL AMBIGUITIES WITH RESPECT TO 
THE CORE FOR MAJORITY RULE VOTING GAMES* 
Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook 
In the context of spatial majority voting games, considerable 
experimental support exists for the core as a solution hypothesis 
when it exists (c.f. Berl, et al, 1976; Fiorina and Plott, 1978). 
Some recent experimentation, however, hints at possible problems in 
a finite alternative setting. Isaac and Plott (1978) report several 
such experiments in which subjects fail to adopt a core, although 
their experimental design uses a particular procedure of chairman 
control that might account for these results. Elsewhere (1979b) we 
report a series of vote trading experiments in which the core's 
success rate is less than fifty percent. 
In this essay we present some additional experimental evidence 
to suggest that committee choice in simple majority rule games is not 
dictated solely by whether or not a Condorcet (core) point exists. 
We conclude that, in the experimental context of open and free discussion, 
the performance of the core is affected by the structure of alternative 
space, and also by the structure of the perceived dominance relation 
beneath the core in the social ordering. 
Section 1 of this essay reviews the results of the vote 
* Prepared for delivery at the Public Choice Convention, March 17-19, 1979 
Charleston, South Carolina. 
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trading games and describes a series of experiments that 1ppe1ar I to 
resolve the question of why the core performs poorly ther1. ISed-.tion 
2 presents an additional series of majority voting games jitJ a 
relatively uncomplicated structure in which the core's su�ces[s tate 
is only about 60 percent. Section 3 summarizes our alterdati�e I I 
explanations of the core failures but concludes that an adeqJate the• 
f . . h . d . . 1 . 1  bl or incorporating sue consi erations is not present y avai a  
1. VOTE TRADING GAMES 
In (1979b) we describe the experimental outcomes of sdvera] 
vote trading games with and without cores. Briefly, in tJose [ gi:tmes, 
subjects are given a list of "bills" (usually 5) and told thah, lby 
. I 
majority rule, they must decide which bills to pass and wJich l t ! 
fail. If a bill is failed, they receive a payoff of zero from Uhat 
bill while if a bill is passed their payoff is either pos�tiv� or 
negative, according to the value assigned to them for thaJ bJll 
The rules of the experiment allow the subjects to establiih 
their own methods of disposing the bills. They can consider the bil] I 
sequentially, or simultaneously as a package. Whenever a �ajbr�ty 
arrives at an agreement on some subset of the bills, they canl erlforce 
 
that agreement by signing an agreement card on those bills. Th�y  
cannot, however reconsider decisions that have already be�n mkd 
Table 1 portrays a vote trading game with a corJ (clr�esport 
to passing only bills C and E, denoted FFPFP). Payoffs fdr a[ g1ven 
individual, aoro•a•billa, �e additive '' tbat, at the ,,,e, fh 
I 
.ng 
payoff vector (10, 1, 13, 5, -8) results.* This game is then 
modified in three ways. First, the payoffs of each player on 
bills C and E are multiplied by -1 so that the core is the more 
"obvious" outcome FFFFF. Second, the apparent vote trade between 
players 1 and 2 on bills A and B -- a trade that leads away from 
the core -- is eliminated by decreasing l's payoff from B to 
-12. Third, various payoffs are adjusted to eliminate possible 
intransitive indifferences around the core. Table 2 summarizes 
the results of these experiments. 
Overall, we see that the core's success rate is only 45 
percent and that the various modifications of the original game 
yield only modest effects. One possible explanation of the above 
results is that it is the separability of the alternative space 
in the vote trading experiment that leads to outcomes away from 
3 
the core. Thus, in the experiment of Table 1, the final alternative 
space consists of exactly 25 = 32 possible outcomes, where each is 
a particular disposition of each of the five bills. Because of 
of the this set, subjects frequently attempt to disaggregate the 
decision by making agreements on only a subset of the bills. In 
the actual experiments, this may be done either for strategic 
reasons -- i.e. a player realizes he can do better by disaggregation 
* � Subjects are given an endowment to cover possible losses. Subjects 
do not know the magnitude of their endowment during the negotiations, 
but only know it is a predetermined fixed amount that will be revealed 
to them at the termination of the experiment. Further details on the 
exact experimental design can be found in McKelvey and Ordeshook [1979b]. 
TABLE 1 
Payoffs for a Core Experiment (Core 
Entries Denote Payoff if Bill is 
Bills 
Player A B c D 
1 10 -2 5 4 
2 -2 10 5 -5 
3 4 -8 5 3 
4 -8 4 -3 -5 
5 -5 -5 -4 -10 
4 
FFPFF) 
Passed 
E 
5 
-4 
8 
-4 
f 
5 
TABLE 2 
Success Rate of the Core* 
Indifference Vote Trade All Original Game Modification Modification 
2 5 3 10 Core = FFFFF 7 7 7 21 
2 4 3 9 Core = FFPFP 7 7 7 21 
4 9 6 19 
14 14 14 42 
(*Numerator is number of core outcomes, denominator is number of trials) 
I . I 
6 i I 
'� be impl��'ed by ao,ually ""1ng 'he deoiainn aequ�,i�lv or 
it may occur through verbal commitments made and adhered to linl the 
negotiations with final decisions being· on all bills simJ1tJne�uslyio 
We know, of course, that such sequential vote trading cal ljad
I I not only to noncore outcomes but to Pareto inferior outcomes 
(c.f. Riker and Brams, 1976). Our initial hypothesis, tJen.I i 
that the deviations from the core reported in Table 2 cal bd 
I !attributed to this separability of the alternative spaceJ 
 
To test this hypothesis we can construct a dejivaf ive 
11finite alternative11 game. Specifically, with 5 bills, the�e lare 
32 possible outcomes. Eliminating six outcomes that, a pribr�,  
are unlikely to be chosen and which occur infrequently in tre 1 barga
.
ilttfing, 
we can label the remaining 26 outcomes A through Z. Eac1h lrtJer, �IJn, 
corresponds to a particular disposition of all five bil�s, �hile 
each player's preference across these alternatives is djducldlfrom 
Table 1. The resulting preference configuration is givjn il Table 
( A d . f I ! t1 see ppen ix A or the actual payoff schedules used and for he 
transformation relating the lettered alternatives of TaJle � o the 
bills of Table 1). To conduct the appropriate experimeJt uli 
pcefer�oe ordera in 'bia 'able, we provide eaon player �'� dbeae 
ordinal rankings and use procedures and instructions that r¢qtlire ti 
subjects use majority rule to choose one and only one aJterladive 
(letter). (A detailed description of the experimental Jesib lof 
g tJ 
these 11finite alternative11 games can be found in McKelve� aid I 
I 
Ordeshook [1979al.) 
t 
Player 1 
x 
H 
E 
F,Q 
B 
I,O 
M 
K,U 
R 
G,P 
D,A 
N 
s,z 
T,W 
c 
J,Y 
v 
L 
TABLE 3 
Finite Alternative, Experiment Fl 
Core = G 
Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 
y x J 
u E N 
N M w 
L,S Q z 
B G G 
J,R F,O,H K,L,R 
T A A 
H,K B,I B,Y 
I D,R,W M,O,V 
G,Z N,T T,E 
D,V P,K S,H 
E z,c C,Q 
F,P u u 
M,W J,V,S D,P,X 
c y I 
o,x L F 
A 
Q 
Preferences of Players 
(ranked from best to worst) 
7 
Player 5 
v 
W,T 
L,P 
G 
Y,J,I,O 
c 
E,N 
A,D,U,K 
B,M 
S,Z,F,Q 
R,X 
H 
I 
I 
i I 
TABLE 4 
Outcomes of Finite Alternativ e 
Experiment Fl 
Outcome Coalition 
Core 12345 
Core 345 
Core 345 
Core 12345 
Core 1345 
Core 1345 
Core 1345 
We see from Table 4 now that, once 
complete packages, the core prevails every t 
that the results reported in Table 2 have a 
the complexity of the corresponding game 
to consider pairwise vote trading as against 
of all bills, leads away from the core. In 
however, we suggest that this explanation is 
forced to cons�d 
. I I I ime. t appears, 
I I straightforward l e 
1nd the myoJic he 
complete djspoki 
the next secbiol, 
incomplete. I 
I 
I ---
'I 
II 
I 
8 
r 
then, 
laJ on
II dency; 
ions 
9 
2. SOME ADDITIONAL AMBIGUITIES 
Note that in Table 3, the core (alternative G) stands at about 
the median of player 1 and 21s preference orders and distinctly 
above the median for players 3, 4, and 5. If subjects make interpersonal 
comparisons of utility based on the position of an alternative in the 
ordering, then the core appears to be a relatively "fair" outcome. 
The experiments reported in this section were originally 
designed to attempt to verify, in a finite alternative setting, 
that the choice of the core point is independent of its "fairness" 
properties. This has already been verified in experiments where the 
alternative space has a spatial representation (c.f. Berl, et al 
[1976], and Fiorina and Plott [1978], where the core predicts well 
regardless of whether it is one player's ideal point or not). We 
initially expected the same results to hold here. 
To address the issue of fairness, consider the experiment 
shown in Table 5, which has a nonempty core, alternative A. Note 
that A is "low" on some preference schedules (players 1 and 4), and 
is player 3's ideal point. We report here two versions of this 
experiment. In the first, subjects are provided with complete ordinal 
information about everyones' preferences, while in the second, they 
are given no information on other subjects' preferences. Table 6 
summarizes the results of thirty trials of this game, controlling 
for the experience of the subjects. 
The results of these experiments provide something less 
than overwhelming support for the core. Overall, the core occurs 
in only 60 percent of the trials. The data also show two additional 
Player 1 
J
E 
D 
c 
L 
B 
I 
G 
N 
M
A
F 
H
K
TABLE 5 
Finite Alternative Experiment F2 
Core = A 
Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 
K A L. 
D B K
E E G 
A F c 
G D I 
c G F 
H c H 
F I M 
B H A 
J K B 
L J E 
I L D 
N M N 
M N J 
Preferences of Players 
(ranked from best to worst) 
Plavek: 5 
-I 
Fi I 
� I B 
H
I 
A! 
N[ 
d I 
L
cl :I 
I
K
Ml
I 
JI 
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patterns. 
(1) Incomplete ordinal information about the preferences 
of other players leads to a higher success rate for 
the core. 
(2) While the relationship is weak, and statistically 
insignificant, in the incomplete information games 
inexperienced subjects appear more likely to choose 
the core than experienced subjects. 
Despite the fact that the core does not predict well in these 
experiments, deviations from the core do not seem to be explainable 
by considerations of fairness. Seven of the twelve failures correspond 
to the choice of alternative E, which benefits three subjects (subjects 
1, 2, and 3) at the expense of the other two. Examination of the 
remaining failures shows that three failures at most (one G and perhaps 
the two B's) can be classified as "fair". Thus, there must be some 
other explanation of the above results. 
Before we attempt to interpret these results more fully, 
however, we can dismiss one simple explanation for the core's failures. 
Specifically, note that E is "good" for three adjacent players, 1, 2, 
and 3. We must consider the possibility, then, that E is chosen simply 
because its acceptability to a majority is more apparent on the 
payoff schedules. Note, in fact, that the frequency of E declines 
appreciably when this visual clue is absent -- when players possess 
incomplete ordinal information about others' preferences. Table 7 
reports a series of trials in which the preference orders of players 
2 and 4 are switched. These results are somewhat equivocal. The 
relative frequency of E decreases, but it still occurs three times out 
I I 
I 
TABLE 6 
Results of Experiment F2 
Complete 
Ordinal Information 
Experienced Inexperienced 
Subjects Subjects 
E (1,2,3) B (1,3,4,5) 
!:. (2,3,5) !:. (2,3,5) 
E (1,2,3) !:. (1,2,3,4,5) 
!:. (2,3,4,5) !:. (3,4,5) 
E (1,2,3) G (2,3,4,5) 
!:. (3,4,5) E (1,2,3) 
E (1,2,3) E (1,2,3) 
43% 43% 
I . Incomp 
Ordirial IIn . 
Experienckd I I 
Subjects I I 
!:. (2,3,5) 
lete [I 
"ormalt 
Inex1� 
Sub II 
II 
! ( fr !:.  .! (2,3,4,5) (� 
(2,3,4 [5) F ! (2 I 
J !:. (2,3,4!5) E I II
F (3,4,5) A (2 
!:. (2,3,415) A (� 
!:. (2,3,4 !5) A (� I 
B (1,3,5) 
!:.  (2,3,4,5) I 
67% 
I 
I 
.. ' 
12 
�m 
I ienced 
2cts 
I 
,5) 
,3,5) 
,4,5) 
,3) 
,4,5) 
,4) 
,3,4,5) 
% 
' 
% of Outcomes 
in Core 
TABLE 7 
Results of Experiment F2 with 
Preference Schedules Reversed 
Outcome Coalition 
A (2,3,4,5) 
A (2,3,5) 
A (2,3,4,5) 
c (1,2,3,4) 
E (1,3,4) 
E (1,3,4) 
E (1,3,4) 
A (1,2,3,4,5) -
50% 
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of the eight trials. The core succeeds 50 percent of the time versus 
43 percent of the time in the previous experiments. None of these 
differences, however, are significant. Hence, we conclude that, even 
if there is a "visual effect," it is not the explanation for the failures 
of the core that we report here. 
A more convincing explanation for these failures concerns 
the specific dominance structure of Experiment F2. Appendix B gives 
the dominance matrix for Experiment F2, which is illustrated in 
Figure 8. Note that A, the core point, is followed by a six element 
cycle set consisting of {E,B,C,G,D,F}, which in turn is followed by 
a five element cycle set consisting of {H,I,J,K,L}. These all beat 
N, which in turn beats the condorcet loser, M. 
I 
There are several things to note about the dominalcel I I 
of Figure 1. First, in the top cycle set below A, E is beate 
by B and, of course, A. Thus, E is staole against any ohhel 
strl 
only, 
I I alternative except these two. Further, both B and A beat E lbyl only, 
three votes, and require the support of exactly the same , co�li�ion 
namely {3,4,5}. Thus, not only is it hard to find an alJerhati· 
to beat E, but it is also difficult to find the right coaliJioh to 
support a change. This is probably exacerbated by the flct lthat 
the coalition that must support a change to A or B -- nale1J {�,4, 
is not the most obvious coalition to support these propoia1l. !The 
coalition includes the one player -- namely player 4, fol wJo 
B are "low" on his ordering and are not very much better l thln 
Oii 
I 
A first glance at the payoff schedules of Table 5 suggests tlha� a I I 
more natural supporting coalition for A is {2,3,5}. In facJ, when I I 
A actually occurs, it frequently is supported by player f (�eel Tab
6).  
The above considerations argue that E is, in some lseµse, 
stable, and it is difficult to move from E to the core, l. IMo 
f h · · f h d · f h. I i urt er inspection o t e ominance structure or t is game Ire 
that, with the exception of alternative N, A beats each h1tJrn
-11 only three votes, and player 3 is always one of the three wqo 
I 
eovi 
eals 
tivJ 
support a change to A. Thus, to get to A from any other po1nt l --- _ 
While it lmikht sl space (except N), player 3 must support the move. 
that it is always in player 31s interest to support such l a Jovp, 
this is true only if player 3 is aware that this proposal i� stable 
If player 3 suspects that A is not stable, then by propobinJ almov -- I  I 
re 
15 
to A, he runs the potential risk of sacrificing whatever he may be 
making from the prevailing proposal. If, for example, the prevailing 
proposal is E, the gain can be fairly small (see Appendix A). 
The preceeding arguments suggest that the dominance structure 
in Experiment F2 account for the core failures. They create a dominance 
pattern that makes E "stable", and that make it necessary to have 
player 3's support to obtain the core outcome. Given the fact that 
there are cycles below the core, a weak or timid player 3 may assume 
that A is also unstable, and hence be unwilling to push for it. The 
result is that the outcomes will tend to be distributed in the top 
cycle below the core, rather than at the core. 
If we consider the core failures, we note that they are, 
in fact, all in the top cycle below the core, distributed, roughly 
in accordance with the vulnerability of these proposals (see Table 8 ) . 
The preceeding explanation also appears to account for the 
differences we observe due to information and experience. The effect 
of incomplete information seems to be that subjects are then forced to 
internalize the relevant preferences of other players and, in doing 
so, learn better the dominance relations in the game. They are also 
forced to consider all alternatives in the process of collecting 
information, and do not have the visual signal of alternative E being 
"high" on the list for a majority. 
The second pattern may be attributed to the fact that 
experienced players expect cycles and instability -- based on having 
played unstable games earlier -- and, as a result, assume that 
every alternative can be beaten by another. What we frequently 
Figure 1: 
Dominance Structure of Experiment F2 
A 
t 
F 
1 
�'/ G 
t
H 
L I 
t
N 
t 
M 
TABLE 8. 
Distribution of Core Failures 
over Top Cycle Below A 
Outcome 
E B C G D F 
Frequency 
Vulnerability* I , , , , 0 2 I 2 3 4 4 4 4 
* Vulnerability 
given proposal 
# of proposals that are majority preferred to 
17 I 
observe, in fact, is subjects becoming "trapped" in a dycje iust 
beneath the core and, rather than attempting to break Jhe !cy¢le, 
they attempt to negotiate the most advantageous outcoml iJ i . 
3. CONCLUSIONS I 
This essay reports on thirty seven experiment�l trials d 
several finite alternative games with a core, in additiln jo revi 
42 vote trading core games. In the vote trading games, l thJ core 
prevails only 45 percent of the time. In the "finite alteJnal:ive" 
the core prevails a modest 60 percent of the time. Thil sjllllil ry f� 
however, disguises much interesting variation. First, jwo �i tine[ 
. I I IIfinite alternative games are considered: In one, namely t�e ame t
lld. I I is equivalent to the vote tra ing game, the core prevails 1!00 perce I I II of the time while in the other, the core prevails only 57 p[er ent 
the time. Second, in the latter game, the core's succeJs rate is 
52 percent with experienced subjects and 64 percent witJ inlx�erien 
players. Finally, with complete ordinal preference infJrmal±Jn, t� 
I I core is chosen 43 percent of the time in the second game, wheneas 
wi<h in oomple<e info�<ion <hi• ra<e inore�e• <o 75 ,erorn 
We conclude that there are at least two reasons for lthe 
depar<ure• from <he core' Complexi<y of <he al<e�a<ivJ •pto 
the structure of the dominance relation. Unfortunately,! alj:h 
above explanations seem to account for the deviations o
J
se+e 
these are ad hoc explanations generated from the partic�lari 
, an_ 
ugh �
her� 
I 
g 
mes, 
re, 
t 
d 
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problems seen in these two games. Since there is no theory that 
incorporates such considerations, there is no way of ascertain
ing 
a priori, whethere these factors are relevant in a given experime
nt, 
and if so, exactly how they will affect the outcome. Further, we 
do not know if there might not be other reasons for departures from 
the core that have not been observed in the experiments run to date. 
In short, we must conclude that the extent to which the core is a 
reasonable prediction about choice depends on a great many things 
that we have not yet begun to understand or appreciate fully. 
APPENDIX A I 
Thi• app�dix ,�,ains payoff •rhedule• for .X.er�• 
"
'
' ii and F2 � well•• 'he 'ran•fo�,i� rela,ing Fl 'o 'he �'� radil l 
experiment. The following list gives that transformation. I thi� 
list, the first entry in each row represents the alternJtive n Fl l 
the second and third entries represent the correspondinJ alhe natiJ 
in the two versions of the vote trading experiments. TJe first I I 
vote trading experiment is that in Table 1, with Core = !FFPFP. 
The second is the vote trading experiment described in t):ie �eJ!ft witi! 
Core = FFFFF. I 
A - DE - CD N - BCE - B 
B - ABCE - AB 0 - AE - AC 
C - D - CDE P - A - ACE 
D - CD - DE Q - ADE - ACD 
E - ACE - A R - BCDE - BD 
F - ACD - ADE S - BCD - BDE 
G - CE - cp T - C - E 
H - ABCDE - ABD U - ABC - ABE 
I - AC - AE v - cp - CE 
J - BE - BC W - E - c 
K - ABE - ABC X - ACDE - AD 
1 - B - BCE Y - BC - BE 
M - CDE - D Z - BDE - BCD 
21 
Table Al gives the payoff schedules for experiment Fl. In 
each of these experiments, the actual schedules used for each subject 
were drawn randomly from three possible payoff schedules: the master 
schedule, which is the schedule in column 1 for each player a schedule 
in which all payoffs were doubled, and a schedule in which all payoffs 
are halved (except for player 4, whose third schedule is the master 
schedule multiplied by a factor of form). This is the same as the 
procedures for generating the payoff schedules in the vote trading 
experiments. The initial endowment (whose magnitude was unknown 
to the subject until termination of the experiment) for each version 
of the payoff schedule is given in the column a at the bottom of 
the table. 
The payoff schedules for Experiment F2 were generated 
using exactly the same procedures as those in McKelvey and Ordeshook 
[1979a]. They are given in Table F2. Again, in each experiment 
for each subject, one payoff schedule was drawn randomly from 
the three schedules listed. 
i I 
22 
TA!BLE Al 
PAYOFF SCHEDULE S FOR EXPERIMENT Fl 
Player 1 Player 2 Pla 1Yer 3 Player 4 Pla,;r 5 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 3 
24 48 12 lS 30 7.SO 20 40 10 12 24 48 0 lo 0 
22 44 11 13 26 6.SO 17 38 8.SO 11 22 44 -4 _8 -2 
20 40 10 11 22 s.so 16 32 8 8 16 32 -s -10 -2 
19 38 9.SO 10 20 s lS 30 7.SO 7 14 28 -8 -16 -4 
18 36 9 9 18 4.SO 13 26 6.SO s 10 20 -9 -18 -4 I lS 30 7.SO 6 12 3 12 24 6 4 8 16 -10 -26 -s 14 28 7 s 10 2.SO 11 22  s.so 3 6 12 -13 -2� -6 
26 6.SO 4 8 9 4.SO 2  13 2 18 1 4 -14 -28 -7 
12 24 6 3 6 l.SO 8 16 4 0 0 0 -18 -36 -9 
10 20 s 1 2 .so s 10 2 .SO -3 -6 -12 -19 -38 -9
.i 119 18 0 4 -4 4.SO 0 . 0  8 2 -8 -16 -23 -46 -11 11' 
8 16 4 -1 -2 -.so 3 6 l.SO -s -10 -20 -28 -S4 -14 
7 14 3.SO -2 -4 -1 1 2 .so -7 -14 -28 
s 10 2.SO -4 -8 -2 0 0 0 -8 -16 -32 
4 8 2 -s -10 -2.SO -3 -6 -1.SO -11 -22 -44 
3 6 l.SO -6 -12 -3 -8 16 -4 -16 -32 -64 
0 0 0 -9 -18 -4.SO 
-2 -4 -1 -11 -22 -s.so 
Cl -7 -17 0 s 2 4 -8 I 2J I �f2 �2,so 0 -6 -17 8 7 I ----< 
a 
I II 
TAELE A2 
PAYOFF SCHEDULESl FOR EXPERIMENT F2 
II 
;a,
Player 1 Player 2 Pl yer 3 Player 4 Player 5 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 1 
II 18 10.50 10 21. 50 12 5 19. 50 12 9 18. 50 14.50 11 18.50 11 4. 11! b 
15 8 8. 50 19 11 3. 50 17 9. 50 8. 50 18 13 8. 50 17. 50 8 2 . b 
12 7 . 50 6 18 10 1. 50 16. 50 7 . 50 6 15. 50 12. 50 6 14. 50 � I 
10.50 6. 50 4.50 16. 50 8 -. 50 16 6 3 15 10 3 13.50 4 1' 
I 
8.50 3. 50 2.50 15 5.50 -1. 50 15. 50 3 . 50 13 9 2.50 13 1.59 -2.r 
7 2 . 50 12 4.50 -3.50 13. 50 0 -2.50 10 8 2 12 9 ,�3 
4.50 -.50 -2 9 2 -5 10.50 -3 -8 8 5 -1 8 -1 r 
2.50 -2 -5 4 -1 -1 1 . 5o -4 -10 3 . 5o -3. 5o 5 -2.50 'IB 
2 -4 -8 2 -3. 50 -10 5. 50 -5 -11 2. 50 -1 -6 2.50 I +. -81( l:l 
-.50 -7 -8.50 0 -5. 50 -11 4. 50 -7 -11. 50 0 -1.50 -8 2 T7 ·10 � b -3 -7. 50 -11.50 -2. 50 -7.50 -13. 50 3 19. 50 -13 -.50 -3.50 -10. 50 -1 19. 10 1 
-5 -8 -12 -4. 50 -10. 50 -14 . 5o -10. 50 -13. 50 -1.50 -5.50 -11 -3.50 -]1 -11. ) 
I I I -6 -8.50 -13 -5.50 -13. 50 -14.50 -2.50 -tl. 50 -15 -4 -8 -12 -5 -11.50 -13. ) 
-7 -11. 50 -16 -8 -14 -15. 50 -5 I -13 -16.50 -5.50 -10.50 -14. 50 -6. 50 -�3 -16 � ) 
4.00 10.00 12. 00 -12.00 -3. 00 4. 00 -14.00 f6. 00 0. 00 LOO 6.00 8.00 -8.00 3.50 711 ) 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
J 
K 
L 
M 
N 
Key: 
A B c D 
2 2 2 
3 3 2 
3 2 3 
3 3 2 
3 3 2 2 
3 2 3 2 
3 3 1 3 
3 3 4 3 
3 4 5 4 
3 3 3 3 
3 3 3 3 
3 3 3 3 
3 4 5 4 
4 5 4 4 
APPENDIX B 
Dominance Matrix for 
Experiment F2 
E F G H I 
2 2 2 2 2 
2 3 2 2 1 
3 2 4 1 0 
3 3 2 2 1 
2 2 2 1 
3 3 1 2 
3 2 1 1 
3 4 4 3 
4 3 4 2 
3 4 3 3 2 
3 3 3 3 3 
3 3 3 3 1 
4 4 5 4 5 
4 4 4 4 4 
Matrix of n(x,y) for 
Experiment 2 
J K L M N 
2 2 2 2 1 
2 2 2 1 0 
2 2 2 0 1 
2 2 2 1 1 
2 2 2 1 1 
1 2 2 1 1 
2 2 2 0 1 
2 2 2 1 1 
3 2 4 0 1 
3 1 1 1 
2 3 1 2 
4 2 0 1 
4 4 5 3 
4 3 4 2 
n(x,y) = number of voters strictly preferring x to y. 
n(x) = max n(x,y) 
y 
l(x) number of alternatives defeating x. 
24 
n(x) l(x) 
2 0 
3 3 
4 4 
3 4 
3 2 
3 4 
3 4 
4 8 
5 9 
4 9 
3 10 
4 9 
5 13 
5 12 
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